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Finding Privacy in a Sea of Social Media 
and Other E-Discovery 
By Allyson Haynes Stuart* 
This article looks at the case law governing discovery of social media and finds several 
problems. First, many courts improperly require a threshold showing that relevant 
information exists in public portions of the user’s social media account before allowing 
such discovery. Second, courts allow overbroad discovery, often requiring a litigant to 
turn over his or her username and password to the other party. At the same time, parties 
seek such information directly from social media sites, attempting an end-run around the 
relevancy requirement and increasing motion practice. The article argues that, instead, 
social media discovery should be treated like other party-driven discovery where litigants 
are entitled to request relevant information that exists on social media accounts and are 
in turn responsible for providing that information just as they would other discovery in 
their possession, custody, or control. There is a promising new line of case law following 
that path. The article then looks more broadly at the emerging issue of privacy in e-
discovery and sets forth the existing methods of restricting undue attempts to invade that 
privacy. Finally, the article argues that the scope of e-discovery dictates a new look at 
the way our discovery rules protect privacy and finds encouragement in the latest 
proposed amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) to limit the scope of 
discovery based on proportionality and relevance to existing claims and defenses. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 150 
II. Discovery of Social Network Information: Both Overinclusive and Underinclusive .. 152 
A. Increase in Requests and Use In All Kinds of Cases ........................................... 152 
B. Courts Improperly Ordering Blanket Access to Social Media ............................ 154 
1. The Threshold Approach .................................................................................. 154 
2. Both Underinclusive and Overinclusive .......................................................... 159 
3. Wasting Judicial Resources .............................................................................. 161 
C. Parties Improperly Seeking Blanket Access Directly from Social Media Sites .. 162 
D. Movement Toward a Better Approach ................................................................ 163 
III. Finding Privacy in a Sea of E-Discovery ............................................................... 166 
A. Putting Social Media in Context .......................................................................... 166 
1. The Format ....................................................................................................... 166 
 
* Professor of Law, Charleston School of Law. The author would like to thank the participants of the 
2013 Privacy Law Scholars Conference, in particular Amanda Conley, Ian Kerr, and Eloïse Gratton, for 
their very helpful comments on an earlier draft; Kelsey Brudvig, Charleston School of Law 2014, for her 
excellent research assistance; and the Faculty of the Charleston School of Law for their support and 
encouragement. 
Vol. 12:3]  Allyson Haynes Stuart 
 150
2. The Public Nature ............................................................................................ 166 
B. What Is the Implication of Using Privacy Settings? ............................................ 168 
C. Narrowing the Scope of Discovery ...................................................................... 171 
D. Privacy Protection Under the Rules ..................................................................... 173 
IV. Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 175 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1  Electronic discovery is one of the biggest challenges our courts face today.1 Its vast 
scope complicates the system in which relevant information is exchanged, and its 
expense can be overwhelming.2 Given the very low number of cases that ever actually go 
to trial,3 pretrial discovery (and related motion practice) is the primary determinant of a 
case’s success.4 Unfortunately, broad discovery can inhibit the search for the truth as 
much as it can further that search, particularly when the discovery sought is of a sensitive 
nature and the prospect of its disclosure is prohibitive to a litigant’s pursuit of the case, 
resulting in a form of discovery blackmail.5 With the advent of social media, discovery 
now often includes information from social media sites, and its potential for misuse is 
high. 
¶2  Courts faced with the discoverability of social media unfortunately have treated the 
issue differently as compared with other types of discovery, giving litigants both more 
and less protection from such requests.6 First, some courts have established a 
“preliminary showing” requirement that a person’s public social network site (SNS) 
information must reveal relevant evidence before the court will allow inquiry into a 
party’s private SNS area as well.7 There is no basis for such a threshold requirement in 
 
1 See RICHARD L. MARCUS, Introduction to SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN, DANIEL J. CAPRA & SEDONA 
CONFERENCE, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE 1 (2d ed. 2012) (“Since the beginning of 
the 21st century, electronic discovery has been the hottest topic in litigation . . . . By one 2011 estimate, the 
annual production of digital information equals 39 million times the amount of information contained in all 
books ever written.”). 
2 See James N. Dertouzos, Nicholas M. Pace & Robert H. Anderson, The RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, 
The Legal and Economic Implications of Electronic Discovery, RAND INST., 3–4 (2008), available at  
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2008/RAND_OP183.pdf   (“[T]he most 
frequent issue raised by those we interviewed was the enormous costs—in time and money—to review 
information that is produced. This is because the sheer volume of records that are identifiable and 
producible is greater with electronic processes, potentially relevant information that might never have been 
recorded previously is now being routinely retained, and because the requesting attorneys are aggressive in 
seeking out such information.”). 
3 Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 
1257–59 (2005) ; Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the 
Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 306–07 (2013) (“I 
am increasingly concerned about procedural changes that have resulted in the earlier and earlier disposition 
of litigation . . . . Today, there are hardly any federal civil trials—let alone jury trials.”). 
4 See Miller, supra note 3, at 307 (“Cases simply do not survive until trial; they are settled or, 
increasingly, dismissed.”). 
5 See Richard L. Marcus, A Modest Proposal: Recognizing (At Last) That the Federal Rules Do Not 
Declare That Discovery Is Presumptively Public, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 331, 340–41 (2006) (discussing the 
“strategic value of discovery into sensitive areas”). 
6 See infra Section II. 
7 Id. 
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the federal rules, which instead allow broad requests for relevant discovery. The 
public/private distinction suggested by SNS users’ privacy settings, while relevant in 
some legal contexts, should not prevent SNS discovery, just as privacy of diaries or 
personal correspondence does not necessarily prevent disclosure in the offline context. 
¶3  Second, and more troubling, once courts do find that such a threshold showing is 
met, they often allow overbroad discovery into the user’s SNS accounts.8 It is as if the 
preliminary showing provides the key to unlocking a litigant’s treasure chest of social 
media content. These courts order a party to turn over her username and password, 
allowing wholesale access to SNS accounts, despite the high likelihood that such access 
will reveal non-relevant and possibly highly private information as well.9  
¶4  Finally, parties are going directly to Facebook and other SNS providers themselves 
with a subpoena seeking account information and content.10 Instead, parties should only 
resort to this tactic if unable to obtain relevant information from the other party. As with 
other discovery, when information is in the custody or control of a party, seeking that 
information from a third party is an option only when there is a showing that the party 
has spoliated evidence or is otherwise wrongfully refusing to produce relevant evidence.11 
In addition, there are valid arguments that direct solicitation of the information from SNS 
providers violates the Stored Communications Act.12 
¶5  Information on social media sites should be treated like other discovery.13 Parties 
should include requests for SNS communications and other content in their discovery 
requests, and the responding party should bear the burden of producing responsive 
information.14 Only if there is a basis for showing that the responding party is 
withholding information should there be any issue of further compelled disclosure.   
¶6  While this article stresses that social media discovery should not be treated 
differently from other discovery—meaning that parties should not be entitled to more or 
less privacy—it also argues that the federal rules should be reexamined in light of the 
magnitude of discoverable electronic information. While the federal rules have been 
modified somewhat to take into account the emergence of vast amounts of electronically 
stored information, additional restrictions on scope are appropriate to counter the 
potential for discovery abuse.15    
¶7  Part II describes the increase in social network discovery and examines court 
decisions regarding discoverability of that information. Courts have largely fallen into 
two camps, one of which grants overbroad blanket access to social media discovery, and 
the other which improperly limits such discovery where there is no relevant public social 
network information. Part II also critiques litigants’ practice of directly requesting access 
from the social network providers themselves, which represents an end-run around the 
 
8 See Section II.B. 
9 Id. 
10 See Section II.C. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 See Steven S. Gensler, Special Rules for Social Media Discovery?, 65 ARK. L. REV. 7, 13 (2012) 
(“[S]ocial-media discovery has not presented any issues that are not covered by the existing discovery 
scheme and that cannot be resolved by sound judicial application of the existing discovery scheme to this 
new technological context.”). 
14 Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
15 See infra Section III.C. 
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relevancy requirement. Finally, Part II notes a promising trend of courts rejecting the all-
or-nothing approach and granting discovery of properly tailored requests for relevant 
social network information. Part III looks more closely at the nature of social media 
discovery and criticizes the tendency to treat the discoverability of such information as a 
function of its semi-public nature. Instead, the fact that social network communications 
have been shared with a limited group of people does not render them automatically 
discoverable.  Part III also discusses the proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure to make discoverability a function of proportionality, and suggests that 
this change could also reduce overbroad social media fishing expeditions. Finally, Part III 
discusses the interaction between discoverability and privacy under the federal rules and 
how those rules may be used properly to protect against undue invasions into personal 
material. Part IV briefly concludes. 
II. DISCOVERY OF SOCIAL NETWORK INFORMATION:  
BOTH OVERINCLUSIVE AND UNDERINCLUSIVE 
A.  Increase in Requests and Use In All Kinds of Cases 
¶8  In less than a decade, there has been an explosion in the use of social media in 
society. Facebook, the most popular online social network, which launched in 2004, has 
over one billion monthly active users worldwide,16 including 167 million users in the 
United States alone,17 and 250 billion photographs have been uploaded onto the site.18 
Half of all adults in America use social networking sites.19 The increase in digital devices 
only adds to social media use, as Americans use smartphones and tablets to access social 
media at all times of the day.20  
¶9  Not surprisingly, social media has invaded the courtroom. Litigants have found 
social media evidence to be very helpful in a vast array of cases. On SNSs, people tend to 
share thoughts, feelings, and information freely and often,21 making such media treasure 
troves of admissions and impeaching evidence,22 especially against individuals claiming 
 
16 Facebook Reports First Quarter 2013 Results, FACEBOOK INVESTOR RELATIONS (May 1, 2013), 
http://investor.fb.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=761090.  
17 This is a drop from 2012, and some believe the social network may be reaching a saturation point. 
Quentin Fottrell, Facebook Loses 1.4 Million Active Users in U.S., MARKET WATCH (Jan. 15, 2013, 5:24 
PM), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2013-01-15/finance/36346107_1_active-users-facebook-social-
media. 
18 FACEBOOK, ERICSSON & QUALCOMM, A FOCUS ON EFFICIENCY 6 (Sept. 16, 2013). 
19 Mary Madden & Kathryn Zickuhr, 65% of Online Adults Use Social Networking Sites, PEWRESEARCH 
INTERNET PROJECT (Aug. 26, 2011), http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2011/Social-Networking-Sites.aspx.  
20 NIELSEN, THE DIGITAL CONSUMER 17 (2014), available at 
http://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/corporate/us/en/reports-downloads/2014%20Reports/the-digital-
consumer-report-feb-2014.pdf (“Two in five (39%) Americans get digitally social while at work, and one 
in five (21%) have logged onto social sites while in the bathroom in the past 30 days.”).  
21 See Ryan A. Ward, Note, Discovering Facebook: Social Network Subpoenas and the Stored 
Communications Act, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 563, 564 (2011) (“Information from these sites is useful 
because ‘users of social network sites often ‘let their hair down’ in a way that surpasses even the 
thoughtless statements that all too often appear in email.’”) (quoting James Parton, Obtaining Records from 
Facebook, LinkedIn, Google and Other Social Networking Websites and Internet Service Providers, DRI 
TODAY (May 24, 2010, 9:40 AM), http://forthedefense.org/post/Obtaining-Records-From-Facebook-
LinkedIn-Google-and-Other-Social-Networking-Websites-and-Internet-Service-Providers.aspx.). 
22 See In the Matter of K.W., 666 S.E.2d 490, 494–95 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that evidence of 
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mental and/or physical damages. Evidence from Facebook has been used in cases to show 
plaintiffs’ exaggeration of their physical23 and emotional injuries;24 parents’ failure to act 
in the best interests of their children;25 spouses’ infidelity;26 and even a criminal 
defendant’s alibi27 or a rape victim’s lack of credibility.28 Practitioners recommend the 
aggressive use of broad interrogatories and document requests aimed at social media 
evidence.29  
¶10  Like other changes to the law wrought by the Internet, the infiltration of social 
media into discovery has not been seamless. Whether it is because of the online nature of 
social media or the candor it provokes, parties and courts have treated it differently from 
other forms of discovery.30 This Article argues that social media should not be treated 
differently but should instead be given as much or as little privacy as civil discovery in 
general. However, the procedural rules themselves should be readdressed to put a check 
on the vast amount of electronic discovery of all kinds that is swallowing the courts.31 
 
minor’s MySpace page was admissible for impeachment purposes as prior inconsistent statement but 
improper exclusion was harmless, and the evidence was not admissible as substantive evidence). 
23 See Loporcaro v. City of N.Y., 950 N.Y.S.2d 723 (Sup. Ct. 2012); Trail v. Lesko, No. GD-10-017249, 
2012 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 194 (C.P. Allegheny County July 3, 2012). 
24 See Mailhoit v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. CV 11-03892, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131095 (C.D. 
Cal. Sept. 7, 2012) (granting defendant’s motion to compel discovery where discovery request was 
narrowed to communications between the plaintiff and her former employer, including those via social 
media but denying motion for more generalized discovery); Robinson v. Jones Lang Lasalle Ams., Inc., 
No. 3:12-cv-00127-PK, 2012 WL 3763545 (D. Or. Aug. 29, 2012) (granting in part and denying in part 
defendant’s motion to compel, applying the same standard to social media content as to other types of 
discoverable materials). 
25 In re S.A., No. 10-0203, 2010 WL 1881524, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 12, 2010) (admitting child’s 
use of inappropriate language on Facebook after midnight as proof of a lack of parental supervision). 
26 Stephanie Chen, Divorce Attorneys Catching Cheaters on Facebook, CNN (June 1, 2010, 11:04 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/social.media/06/01/facebook.divorce.lawyers/. A survey found that 81% 
of the members of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers have used or defended against evidence 
from social networking sites. Christopher B. Hopkins & Tracy T. Segal, Discovery of Facebook Content in 
Florida Cases, TRIAL ADVOC. Q., Spring 2012, at 14 (citing Leanne Italie, Divorce lawyers: Facebook 
Tops in Online Evidence in Court, USA TODAY (June 29, 2010, 10:41 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2010-06-29-facebook-divorce_N.htm.). 
27 Damiano Beltrami, His Facebook Status Now? ‘Charges Dropped,’ LOCAL: FORT GREEN/CLINTON 
HILL (Nov. 11, 2009, 11:10 AM), http://fort-greene.thelocal.nytimes.com/2009/11/11/his-facebook-status-
now-charges-dropped/. 
28 Stephanie Francis Ward, MySpace Discovery: Lawyers Are Mining Social Networks for Nuggets of 
Evidence, ABA J., Jan. 2007, at 34, available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/next/. But see 
State v. Corwin, 295 S.W.3d 572 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009), discussed in Beth C. Boggs & Misty L. Edwards, 
Does What Happens On Facebook Stay on Facebook? Discovery, Admissibility, Ethics, and Social Media, 
98 ILL. B.J. 366, 369 (2010). 
29 See Hopkins & Segal, supra note 26, at 14–15 (providing sample interrogatory seeking username and 
password for any social media site used by the plaintiff in the previous five years and stating that the 
authors “as a general practice . . . request that plaintiffs execute a consent and authorization permitting 
them to obtain account content directly from the social media website,” noting that such access “may lead 
to evidence of alteration or deletion”); see also Monique C.M. Leahy, Pretrial Involving Facebook, 
MySpace, LinkedIn, Twitter, and Other Social Networking Tools, 121 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE PROOF 
OF FACTS 3d 1, § 25 (2010). 
30 See infra Section II.B. 
31 See infra Section III.C. 
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B. Courts Improperly Ordering Blanket Access to Social Media 
1.  The Threshold Approach 
¶11  A majority approach to social media discovery has developed.32 The majority of 
courts faced with motions to compel access to a litigant’s social media require a 
preliminary showing by the moving party that public portions of the person’s SNS have 
relevant information, usually because that content somehow contradicts positions taken 
by the SNS user in the lawsuit. Once this threshold is met, the keys to the person’s social 
media are given to the moving party, which then has blanket access to the person’s SNS 
content.33  
¶12  One of the earliest U.S. examples of the threshold approach is found in Romano v. 
Steelcase.34 In this personal injury action, the defendant sought access to the plaintiff’s 
current and historical Facebook and MySpace content, arguing that it was relevant to the 
extent and nature of the plaintiff’s injuries, including loss of enjoyment of life. The court 
noted that the plaintiff’s public profile page “show[ed] her smiling happily in a 
photograph outside the confines of her home despite her claim that she ha[d] sustained 
permanent injuries and [was] largely confined to her house and bed.”35 Therefore, the 
court found “a reasonable likelihood that the private portions of her sites may contain 
further evidence such as information with regard to her activities and enjoyment of 
life.”36 The court found plaintiff’s privacy concerns to be low—she knew the information 
may become publicly available based on the policies of the SNSs themselves—and in any 
event outweighed by the defendant’s need for the information.37 So, the court ordered the 
plaintiff to execute a consent and authorization to Facebook and MySpace permitting 
defendants access to all of the plaintiff’s records, including ones that had been deleted or 
archived.38  
 
32 The forerunners of this approach were primarily New York state trial and appellate courts. See Tapp 
v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 958 N.Y.S.2d 392 (App. Div. 2013). There are obviously more appellate 
decisions in states like New York that allow interlocutory appeals from discovery orders, but the trend is 
apparent from published orders in other jurisdictions as well. See, e.g., infra notes 56 and 57 (listing cases). 
33 In addition to the New York cases discussed above, courts from other states like Pennsylvania and 
federal courts have also followed this approach. See Thompson v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-01375-
PMP-VCF, 2012 WL 2342928, at *4–5 (D. Nev. June 20, 2012) (ordering plaintiff to upload all 
information from her Facebook and MySpace accounts onto an electronic storage device for review by 
defense counsel); Largent v. Reed, No. 2009-1823, 2011 WL 5632688, at *3, *6–7 (Pa. C.P. Nov. 8, 2011); 
Zimmerman v. Weis Markets, Inc., No. CV-09-1535, 2011 WL 2065410, at *2–3 (Pa. C.P. May 19, 2011); 
McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113-2010 CD, 2010 WL 4403285, at *4 (Pa. C.P. Sept. 9, 
2010). 
34 Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650 (Sup. Ct. 2010). 
35 Id. at 654. The opinion does not mention the date of the profile picture or whether it was taken after 
the subject accident.  
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 656.  
38 Id. at 657. One reason for the broad disclosure ordered in Romano may be the peculiarity of New 
York’s “Scope of Disclosure” rules. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101 requires “full disclosure of any films, 
photographs, video tapes or audio tapes, including transcripts or memoranda thereof, involving a [party to 
the action].” N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101(i) (McKinney 2009). The commentary to that rule states that “[t]his 
provision generally requires production of any films, photos and videos of the plaintiff, regardless of 
whether the material is relevant,” N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101 cmt. 3101:50 (McKinney 2009) (citing Tran v. New 
Rochelle Hosp., 786 N.E.2d 444 (N.Y. 2003)). But the court in Tran was referring to surveillance tapes 
made by defendants of plaintiffs in the context of personal injury actions, for which the relevance was not 
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¶13  Romano relied primarily on case law from Canada, including the 2009 Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice case Leduc v. Roman.39 In that case, Leduc sued for injuries 
sustained in an automobile accident. In a medical examination conducted for purposes of 
discovery, the plaintiff told the doctor that he did not have many friends in the area but 
had “a lot on Facebook.”40 The defendant moved for production of all materials on the 
plaintiff’s Facebook site and for an updated affidavit from the plaintiff listing relevant 
documents.41 After the lower court refused to order production, the court of appeals 
“share[d the lower court’s] concern about the breadth of the defendant’s request” but 
thought the defendant should be permitted to cross-examine the plaintiff as to “what 
relevant content, if any, was posted on [his] Facebook profile.” 42 The lower court had 
“correctly interpreted [Canadian law] as requiring some evidence from a moving party 
pointing to the omission of a relevant document in the other’s affidavit of documents” but 
 
questioned. Tran, 786 N.E.2d at 444. Another commentary suggests that those materials are not excluded 
from the rules’ limitation on relevance. After noting the lack of any limitation on scope in 3101(i), the 
commentary states nevertheless that “[t]he relevance standard in CPLR 3101(a) has generally been 
understood to apply to all disclosure, regardless of the materials sought or the particular device used.” N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. 3101 cmt 3101:50 (McKinney 2009), citing Kavanagh v. Ogden Allied Maint. Corp., 705 N.E.2d 
1197 (N.Y. 1998). In any event, the statutory provision only covers photographs and videos, not written 
messages or comments (all of which must be disclosed under Romano). See NY C.P.L.R. 3101(i) 
(McKinney 2009). And more importantly, the Romano court itself did not mention, much less rely upon, 
any argument that the scope of 3101(i) is broader than other discovery. Instead, the court specifically states 
that the Facebook and MySpace postings “may contain further evidence such as information with regard to 
her activities and enjoyment of life, all of which are material and relevant to the defense of this action.” 
Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 654 (emphasis added). 
39 Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 654–55. The court also cited Ledbetter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 06-cv-
01958-WYD-MJD, 2009 WL 1067018 (D. Colo. Apr. 21, 2009), where defendants had subpoenaed 
information from Facebook, MySpace and Meetup.com. The SNSs had refused to comply with the 
subpoena, so the defendant sought releases from the plaintiffs, who were alleging physical and 
psychological injuries arising from an electrical accident. See id. at *1. In a brief opinion, the magistrate 
judge denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a protective order regarding the subpoenas. Id. at *2. The plaintiffs 
had requested that the magistrate judge review the subpoenaed information in camera for purposes of 
removing material protected by physician-patient and spousal privilege. Id. at *1. The court found the 
plaintiffs had waived any such physician-patient privilege by seeking damages for their physical and 
mental injuries, and spousal privilege had been waived when the spouse herself joined the suit seeking loss 
of consortium. Id. The court also found the existing protective order in the case adequately protected the 
plaintiffs’ privacy interests. Id. at *2. Finally, the court found that the information sought in the subpoenas 
was reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Id. It is not clear whether the 
plaintiffs had ever objected to the subpoenas on grounds of relevance or otherwise. See Plaintiffs’ Response 
in Opposition to Defendant Wal-Mart’s Motion to Compel Production of Content of Social Networking 
Sites, Ledbetter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 06-cv-01958-WYD-MJD, 2009 WL 1067018 (D. Colo. Apr. 
21, 2009), 2009 WL 3061764 (arguing that the defendants had chosen to use subpoenas to obtain the 
information and therefore should continue to pursue the information directly from the SNS’s, not by 
seeking releases from the plaintiffs).  
40 Leduc v. Roman, [2009] O.J. No. 681, at para. 3 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)(QL). 
41 Id. at para. 6. 
42 Id. at para. 35; see also id. at para. 15 (“Master Dash did not err in his articulation of the law regarding 
motions under Rule 30.06. He acknowledged that Mr. Leduc had an obligation to produce all relevant 
documents in his possession, including any information posted on his private Facebook profile 
demonstrating activities and enjoyment of life, ‘even if it is contrary to his interests in this action.’ Master 
Dash also correctly noted that where, on a Rule 30.06 motion, the defendant contends that the plaintiff has 
not met his obligation to produce relevant documents, then the defendant must provide some evidence that 
the plaintiff has relevant materials in his possession or control.”).  
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should have “afford[ed] the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Leduc on that 
affidavit regarding the kind of content posted on his Facebook profile.”43 The court did 
not grant a broad request for disclosure of all Facebook information.  
¶14  Romano misread Leduc both in its breadth of production required and in reasoning 
that a threshold showing of existence of relevant information in publicly-accessible 
material justified disclosure of the private information as well. The Leduc court discussed 
the only previous case to consider the issue, also from Canada and also involving a claim 
for loss of enjoyment of life resulting from injuries suffered in a car accident. In Murphy 
v. Perger,44 “[t]he plaintiff had posted photographs on her publicly-accessible Facebook 
profile showing her engaged in various social activities. The defendant moved for 
production of any photographs maintained on the private Facebook profile over which the 
plaintiff had control.”45 The court found it reasonable to conclude that relevant 
photographs were posted on the private site, in part because the plaintiff had produced 
pictures of herself in the litigation from before the accident.46 The court found that any 
invasion of privacy was minimal and outweighed by the defendant’s need to have the 
photographs in order to assess the case and ordered the plaintiff “to produce copies of the 
web pages posted on her private site, subject to the ability of plaintiff’s counsel to make 
future submissions in the event that any of the photographs personally embarrassed the 
plaintiff.”47 
¶15  The plaintiff in Leduc had not posted any photographs or other material in the 
public portion of his Facebook profile.48 Rather than allowing this fact to insulate his 
Facebook account from discovery, the court found “[a] party who maintains a private, or 
limited access, Facebook profile stands in no different position than one who sets up a 
publicly-available profile. Both are obliged to identify and produce any postings that 
relate to any matter in issue in an action.”49 Therefore, neither case ordered blanket access 
to the party’s SNS material; instead, they found that relevant material should be 
produced.  
¶16  In addition, Romano has been cited as precedent for applying a threshold approach 
to SNS evidence, but, in fact, the Canadian law applied in Leduc and Murphy—unlike 
U.S. law—specifically requires such a threshold showing. In what are known as 
“simplified rules” cases like Leduc, which do not permit discovery as of right, a movant 
is required to present evidence that the other party possesses a relevant document before 
the court can order production.50 That evidence may come from “questions asked on a 
party’s examination for discovery about the existence and content of the person’s 
Facebook profile,”51 or from evidence of relevant information on the public portion of the 
 
43 Id. at para. 36. 
44 Id. at para. 24 (discussing Murphy v. Perger, [2007] O.J. No. 5511 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)(QL)). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at para. 25. 
48 Id. at para. 31. 
49 Id. at para. 32. Instead, the court stated that “mere proof of the existence of a Facebook profile does 
not entitle a party to gain access to all material placed on that site.” Id. at para. 33. 
50 Id. at para. 33 (“Rule 30.06 requires the presentation of some evidence that a party possesses a 
relevant document before a court can order production.”). 
51 Id. at para. 33; see also id. (“Where the party’s answers reveal that his Facebook profile contains 
content that may relate to issues in an action, production can be ordered of the relevant content.”). 
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Facebook profile.52 In Leduc, there was no such public information, and the defendant 
had not questioned the plaintiff about his Facebook profile because he only learned of its 
existence from the plaintiff’s medical examination. 
¶17  Nonetheless, the court in Romano cited Leduc, as well as several other Canadian 
decisions granting limited access to Facebook materials, as support for its decision to 
allow the defendants complete access to the plaintiff’s social media accounts upon 
finding that the publicly available SNS evidence contradicted the plaintiff’s claims.53 
¶18  Other courts have followed Romano’s approach of deciding whether a threshold 
showing has been met, and, if so, allowing complete access to the SNS accounts.54 The 
approach has been followed by other New York state courts55 and endorsed by its court of 
appeals.56 Pennsylvania’s state courts also follow the threshold approach.57 And numerous 
 
52     Simplified Rules cases do not permit discovery as of right, so other circumstances may arise 
where a party learns of the existence of another’s Facebook profile, but cannot examine the 
person on the site’s content. In such cases trial fairness dictates that the party who discovers 
the Facebook profile should enjoy some opportunity to ascertain and test whether the 
Facebook profile contains content relevant to any matter in issue in an action. One way to 
ensure this opportunity is to require the Facebook user to preserve and print-out the posted 
material, swear a supplementary affidavit of documents identifying any relevant Facebook 
documents and, where few or no documents are disclosed, permit the opposite party to cross-
examine on the affidavit of documents in order to ascertain what content is posted on the site. 
Where the parties do not consent to following this process, recourse to the courts may be 
made.  
Id. at para. 34. 
53 Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 640, 654–55 (Sup. Ct. 2010). 
54 None of these courts recognizes that Romano was following Canadian precedent that, unlike U.S. law, 
clearly required such a threshold showing. 
55 Loporcaro v. City of N.Y., 950 N.Y.S.2d 723 (Sup. Ct. 2012) (ordering an in camera inspection of all 
Facebook postings, including deleted material, so the court may assess materiality and relevance, based on 
the fact that the plaintiff has posted at least some information publicly which may contradict his claims); 
Winchell v. Lopiccolo, 954 N.Y.S.2d 421 (Sup. Ct. 2012) (denying a motion to compel authorization of 
Facebook account because the defendant failed to establish the factual predicate that Facebook information 
may be relevant).  
56 Tapp v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 958 N.Y.S.2d 392 (App. Div. 2013) (denying request for 
Facebook authorization where defendants failed to make a showing that the content would be relevant); 
Nieves v. 30 Ellwood Realty LLC, 966 N.Y.S.2d 808 (App. Term 2013) (remanding for in camera 
inspection of plaintiff’s Facebook records because the defendant demonstrated that plaintiff’s public profile 
contained photos probative of the extent of her injuries). 
57 Largent v. Reed, No. 2009-1823, 2011 WL 5632688, at *6 n.3, *7 (Pa. C.P. Nov. 8, 2011) (finding 
that the public portion of plaintiff’s SNS profile gave a good faith basis for the defendant’s request to 
access the private portion, and ordering the plaintiff to provide the defendant with her login and password 
for twenty-one days); Zimmerman v. Weis Markets, Inc., No. CV-09-1535, 2011 WL 2065410, at *2–4 
(Pa. C.P. May 19, 2011) (ordering disclosure of plaintiff’s passwords and log-in names for SNS accounts 
because the public portions were inconsistent with plaintiff’s claims of permanent injury and inability to 
enjoy life); McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113-2010 CD, 2010 WL 4403285, at *4 (Pa. 
C.P. Sept. 9, 2010) (ordering the plaintiff to provide his SNS user names and passwords to the defendants 
because the public portion revealed comments about a fishing trip and car race attendance, while plaintiff 
alleged substantial injuries and loss of enjoyment of life); see also Gallion v. Gallion, No. FA114116955S, 
2011 WL 4953451 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2011) (ordering that attorneys exchange clients’ Facebook 
and dating website passwords after husband reported seeing incriminating information on computer he 
shared with his wife). 
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federal district courts have also applied this standard, including courts in New York, 
Colorado, Nevada, Tennessee, and Michigan.58  
¶19  The reasoning of these courts is akin to finding that a plaintiff seeking substantial 
injuries has waived any right to privacy of SNS data by revealing some public content 
that contradicts those claims. As the court stated in McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, 
Inc.,  
[a]ccessing only the public portion of [the plaintiff’s] Facebook page, . . . the 
defendants have discovered posts they contend show that McMillen has 
exaggerated his injuries. Certainly a lack of injury and inability is relevant to 
their defense, and it is reasonable to assume that McMillen may have made 
additional observations about his travels and activities in private posts not 
currently available to the defendants. If they do exist, gaining access to them 
could help to prove either the truth or falsity of McMillen’s alleged claims.59 
¶20  In addition, many courts are ordering wholesale access to a party’s SNS account 
although it is not clear whether the court found any threshold required or met.60 These 
courts treat information on private portions of SNS as being a single source, permissible 
or not, without any consideration of the relevance of individual aspects of the SNS 
account.61 In a recent case from the District of Colorado, a court granted a motion to 
 
58 Potts v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-01180, 2013 WL 1176504, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 
2013) (denying production where the defendant failed to produce “any evidentiary showing that Plaintiff’s 
public Facebook profile contains information that will reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence”); Reid v. Ingerman Smith LLP, No. CV 2012-0307(ILG)(MDG), 2012 WL 6720752, at *1–2 
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2012) (finding the photos and comments posted by the plaintiff on her publicly 
available Facebook pages probative, so private postings may likewise be relevant, but declining to require 
full disclosure of all SNS materials because not all will be relevant); EEOC v. Original Honeybaked Ham 
Co. of Ga., Inc., No. 11-cv-02560-MSK-MEH, 2012 WL 5430974, at *2 (D. Colo. Nov. 7, 2012) (finding 
that where publicly available Facebook information from one class member was relevant, “each class 
member’s social media content should be produced, albeit in camera in the first instance”); Thompson v. 
Autoliv ASP, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-01375-PMP-VCF, 2012 WL 2342928 (D. Nev. June 20, 2012); Glazer v. 
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., No. 11 Civ. 4374(PGG)(FM), 2012 WL 1197167, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2012) 
(ordering plaintiff to create a new SNS account, allowing her to access all her old and deleted chats, and 
turn over all chat transcripts to the defendant); Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387, 389 
(E.D. Mich. 2012) (denying defendant’s motion to compel plaintiff to execute authorizations releasing 
Facebook account because defendant has not made a threshold showing that the requested information is 
likely to lead to relevant evidence). 
59 McMillen, 2010 WL 4403285, at *6. 
60 Davenport v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., No. 3:11-cv-632-J-JBT, 2012 WL 555759 (M.D. Fla. 
Feb. 21, 2012) (limiting scope of request from “[a]ll photographs posted, uploaded, or otherwise added to 
any social networking sites or blogs . . . since the date of the accident alleged in the Complaint” to all such 
photographs depicting the plaintiff, regardless of who posted them); Bass v. Miss Porter’s Sch., No. 
3:08cv1807 (JBA), 2009 WL 3724968 (D. Conn. Oct. 27, 2009); Beswick v. North West Med. Ctr., Inc., 
No. 07-020592 CACE (03), 2011 WL 7005038 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 3, 2011). 
61 Plaintiffs were ordered to turn over their SNS passwords and login information in Largent, 2011 WL 
5632688 (Pa. C.P. Nov. 8, 2011); Zimmerman, 2011 WL 2065410 (Pa. C.P. May 19, 2011); Romano v. 
Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 657 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (ordering execution of a consent and 
authorization permitting the defendant to access the plaintiff’s Facebook and MySpace accounts); 
McMillen, 2010 WL 4403285; Beswick, 2011 WL 7005038 (granting a motion to compel a response to an 
interrogatory which requested login and password information or, in the alternative, to provide a copy of all 
data for the previous five years, and ordering that the plaintiffs sign a consent and authorization to permit 
the defendants to gain access to the plaintiff’s Facebook records); Gatto v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 10-
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compel the plaintiff’s entire Facebook history in a case alleging the use of excessive force 
in an arrest.62 The court found that the plaintiff’s allegations of physical injury and 
emotional distress were broad enough to encompass his entire Facebook activity without 
limitation.63 
2. Both Underinclusive and Overinclusive 
¶21  The cases discussed above have deservedly been criticized for ordering too much 
disclosure.64 The blanket access to social media that is allowed to parties who are able to 
meet the threshold showing (or not required to meet a threshold) includes irrelevant and 
potentially very private content. 
¶22  But also important is the fact that courts are on occasion ordering too little 
disclosure. There is no basis in the federal rules, or in the many state rules based on them, 
to require a preliminary showing that relevant discovery exists before allowing a party to 
request that discovery.65 These courts forbid any discovery of social media if that 
threshold is not met.66 Instead, under U.S. discovery rules, parties are generally entitled to 
relevant information from litigants contained in those sites regardless of the extent to 
which publicly available information contradicts a plaintiff’s claims.67  
¶23  One source of the problem, of course, is that the parties’ attorneys themselves often 
seek all access to SNS accounts rather than only seeking relevant information. In such a 
 
cv-1090-ES-SCM, 2013 WL 1285285 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2013) (granting a request for an adverse inference 
instruction in a spoliation dispute arising out of the plaintiff’s deletion of his Facebook account after being 
ordered by the court to execute an authorization for the release of documents and information from 
Facebook, and to change his account password to “alliedunited” to facilitate defendants’ access). 
62 Moore v. Miller, No. 10-cv-651-JLK, 2013 WL 2456114 (D. Colo. June 6, 2013). 
63 See id. at *2–3. 
64 Gensler, supra note 13, at 18 (noting that the court in Romano “effectively ordered the production of 
irrelevant information,” and that Largent and McMillen made the same error); see also Mallory Allen & 
Aaron Orheim, Note, Get Outta My Face[book]: The Discoverability of Social Networking Data and the 
Passwords Needed to Access Them, 8 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 137, 150 (2012) (“Granting such sweeping 
access represents a break from traditional electronic discovery orders.”). 
65 See Gensler, supra note 13, at 18–19 (questioning whether cases should be construed as requiring 
such a preliminary showing of relevance and stating that “if courts were to start requiring a predicate 
showing of relevance before allowing a party to seek discovery of specific content from social-media sites, 
that would constitute a barrier to discovery that does not exist in other contexts”). The closest analogy may 
be to the sampling allowed in electronic discovery cases where the parties argue that certain ESI is not 
reasonably accessible. Before requiring wholesale recovery of such ESI, courts may order a portion 
restored and base further disclosure on the relevance of that sample. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 
217 F.R.D. 309, 323–24 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (ordering defendant to restore information and produce 
information to plaintiff). 
66 See, e.g., Potts v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-01180, 2013 WL 1176504, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. 
Mar. 20, 2013); Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387, 388 (E.D. Mich. 2012); Levine v. 
Culligan of Fla., Inc., No. 50-2011-CA-010339-XXXXMB, 2013 WL 1100404, at *6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 29, 
2013); Tapp v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 958 N.Y.S.2d 392 (App. Div. 2013); McCann v. Harleysville 
Ins. Co., 910 N.Y.S.2d 614 (App. Div. 2010); Fawcett v. Altieri, 960 N.Y.S.2d 592 (Sup. Ct. 2013); 
Brogan v. Rosenn, Jenkins & Greenwald, LLP, No. 08 CV 6048, 2013 WL 1742689, at *6, *8 (Pa. C.P. 
Apr. 22, 2013); Arcq v. Fields, No. 2008-2430, slip op. at 3–4 (Pa. C.P. Dec. 8, 2011).  
67 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Unless otherwise limited by court order, [p]arties may obtain discovery 
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense—including the existence, 
description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any documents or other tangible things and the 
identity and location of persons who know of any discoverable matter.”). 
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case, a court would properly find that the party is engaging in a fishing expedition.68 In a 
2012 article, Professor Steven Gensler questioned whether early cases should be read as 
requiring a predicate showing of relevance in any cases other than those where the 
moving party sought blanket access to the SNS site, arguing that “Tompkins and Romano 
are best read as speaking to the showing required to obtain access to an entire account, 
not to whether a party must make a prima facie showing before it can make specific, 
targeted requests.”69  
¶24  Certainly, many court decisions arise out of requests for access to an entire account. 
Some courts do chastise the party that made the overbroad request, noting that a more 
tailored request would be appropriate.70 But other courts that deny blanket access do not 
do so solely on the basis that the request is overbroad. Rather, they also stress that the 
showing that relevant evidence exists has not been met.71 
¶25  More importantly, courts have denied access to SNS information because of a 
failure to meet the threshold showing even when the request is tailored. For instance, a 
Florida district court recently denied a plaintiff’s request for social media discovery from 
the defendants in a case for excessive force brought by the father of a deceased man who 
had been arrested by the defendants.72 The plaintiff did not seek all social media evidence 
from the defendants, instead requesting only social media communications “that relate in 
any way to the incident that is described in the Second Amended Complaint.”73 Certainly, 
had the defendants discussed the arrest of the plaintiff’s son in Facebook postings, those 
communications would likely be relevant in the lawsuit concerning that arrest. But 
applying the threshold approach, the Florida court found no showing of the existence of 
relevant evidence and denied the discovery request in toto as a fishing expedition:  
Here, Plaintiff simply contends that the requests are relevant because, “Plaintiff 
is seeking information about statements that Defendant Brown made about the 
incident at issue in this case, which could include admissions against interest, and 
could certainly lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” The mere hope that 
Brown’s private text-messages, e-mails, and electronic communication might 
include an admission against interest, without more, is not a sufficient reason to 
require Brown to provide Plaintiff open access to his private communications 
with third parties.74 
Accordingly, the threshold approach has led courts to deny appropriate discovery in 
addition to granting too much discovery.  
 
68 See Tompkins, 278 F.R.D. at 389; McCann, 910 N.Y.S.2d at 615. 
69 Gensler, supra note 13, at 18 n.41. 
70 See Howell v. Buckeye Ranch, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-1014, 2012 WL 5265170 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 1, 2012). 
71 See Arcq, No. 2008-2430, slip op. at 2 (“We find that there lies one glaring, distinguishing factor that 
prevents us from [granting access]: Defendant’s request is not the result of viewing the public portion of 
Plaintiff’s profile.”); Brogan, 2013 WL 1742689, at *6 (“The Brogans have not established that Breault 
published information on the publicly viewable portion of her Facebook account which refutes or questions 
the veracity of her assertions in this case.”). 
72 See Salvato v. Miley, No:5:12-CV-635-Oc-10PRL, 2013 WL 2712206 (M.D. Fla. June 11, 2013). 
73 Id. at *2. 
74 Id.  
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3. Wasting Judicial Resources 
¶26  In the effort to provide an element of privacy protection, many courts have ordered 
in camera review of the SNS evidence.75 Although this solution is an admirable attempt to 
protect litigants’ privacy, it is untenable as a general approach. It wastes judicial 
resources and is not justified in the law.76 In Patterson v. Turner,77 the appellate court 
correctly found the lower court’s order that the plaintiff produce all Facebook 
information after it had conducted an in camera review to be overbroad.78 But rather than 
finding that the plaintiff should be ordered to produce only relevant information, the 
appellate court remanded for the lower court’s own determination of what specific 
Facebook information is relevant and subject to disclosure.79 Under this result, instead of 
counsel producing responsive information, the court itself must sift through the SNS 
account content and determine what is relevant.80 There is no reason to trust litigants’ 
counsel less because of the nature of social media; there is just as much risk of 
underproduction of other types of discovery left in the hands of counsel.81 
¶27  Some courts recognize that the onus should be on counsel, not on the judge, to 
review discovery for relevance. As the court noted in Fawcett v. Altieri, “asking courts to 
review hundreds of transmissions ‘in camera’ should not be the all purpose solution to 
protect the rights of litigants. Courts do not have the time or resources to be the 
researchers for advocates seeking some tidbit of information that may be relevant in a tort 
claim.”82  
¶28  Instead, parties should seek targeted social media discovery as part of regular 
discovery requests.83 Just like requests for email and other communications, there will be 
 
75 See, e.g., Offenback v. L.M. Bowman, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-1789, 2011 WL 2491371 (M.D. Pa. June 
22, 2011); Richards v. Hertz Corp., 953 N.Y.S.2d 654 (App. Div. 2012); Nieves v. 30 Ellwood Realty 
LLC, 966 N.Y.S.2d 808 (App. Term 2013); Loporcaro v. City of N.Y., 950 N.Y.S.2d 723 (Sup. Ct. 2012). 
Another creative but also time-consuming solution for the judge is illustrated by Barnes v. CUS Nashville, 
LLC, No. 3:09-cv-00764, 2010 WL 2265668 (M.D. Tenn. June 3, 2010), where the magistrate judge 
offered to “friend” the third parties whose SNS pictures were relevant. 
76 See Gensler, supra note 13, at 25 (“Under standard discovery practice, a court generally should wait 
until the information holder makes his or her response after the initial review, and then get involved only if 
there is a dispute regarding objections to the request or the sufficiency of the production.”). 
77 Patterson v. Turner Const. Co., 931 N.Y.S.2d 311 (App. Div. 2011). 
78 See id. at 312. 
79 See id. 
80 See EEOC v. Original Honeybaked Ham Co. of Ga., No. 11-cv-02560-MSK-MEH, 2012 WL 
5430974 (D. Colo. Nov. 7, 2012); Thompson v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-01375-PMP-VCF, 2012 
WL 2342928 (D. Nev. June 20, 2012); Bass v. Miss Porter’s School, No. 3:08cv1807 (JBA), 2009 WL 
3724968 (D. Conn. Oct. 27, 2009). 
81 See Hubbard v. Potter, 247 F.R.D. 27, 29 (D.D.C. 2008) (“Speculation that there is more [responsive 
discovery] will not suffice; if the theoretical possibility that more documents exist sufficed to justify 
additional discovery, discovery would never end.”); Gensler, supra note 13, at 26 (“The last thing courts 
want—or have the practical ability to do—is to undertake their own search or review whenever the 
requesting party suspects the response might not be complete.”). 
82 Fawcett v. Altieri, 960 N.Y.S.2d 592, 597–98 (Sup. Ct. 2013); see also Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. 
Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387, 389 n.4 (“I decline the parties’ alternative suggestion that I conduct an in camera 
review of Plaintiff’s private Facebook postings. Such review is ordinarily utilized only when necessary to 
resolve disputes concerning privilege; it is rarely used to determine relevance.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
83 See Gensler, supra note 13, at 23 (“The longstanding general rule is that people review their own 
records when responding to discovery requests.”).  
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some relevant and some irrelevant information.  Counsel has the task of sorting through it  
and figuring out what is responsive. If responsive information is improperly withheld, the 
requesting party has all the normal tools at his disposal to compel production.84 
C. Parties Improperly Seeking Blanket Access Directly from Social Media Sites 
¶29  Exacerbating the issue is the tendency of litigants to subpoena social media 
information from SNSs directly.85 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been 
revised in an effort to reduce the cost and time expended in disputes related to electronic 
discovery86 and to decrease the involvement of judges in unnecessary discovery 
disputes.87 However, many litigants’ approach to social media discovery has resulted in 
just the opposite: counsel often seek discovery not from the other party but directly from 
the SNS itself, which consequently guarantees motion practice before the court.  
¶30  Seeking direct access to SNS information from the providers may violate the 
Stored Communications Act,88 which prohibits remote computing and electronic 
communication service providers from divulging the contents of a communication while 
in storage.89 Some courts have quashed subpoenas on this basis.90   
¶31  In addition, because the SNS providers will not review the discovery for relevance 
before complying with a subpoena, seeking this information directly from the SNS 
providers allows an end-run around the relevancy requirements of the rules. Indeed, the 
SNSs themselves are loath to respond to such subpoenas at all without a court order.91 
 
84 See id. at 26 (“[In] the social media context, courts would have no reason to undertake an in camera 
review of a party’s social-media content unless the requesting party had some specific, non-speculative 
grounds to argue that the account contained responsive materials that the account holder had failed to 
disclose.”). 
85 See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 06-cv-01958-WYD-MJW, 2009 WL 1067018 (D. 
Colo. Apr. 21, 2009). 
86 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note (discussing reduction of scope based on 
concerns about cost and delay); see also THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE 
COOPERATION PROCLAMATION 1 (2008) (“Over-contentious discovery is a cost that has outstripped any 
advantage in the face of ESI and the data deluge. It is not in anyone’s interest to waste resources on 
unnecessary disputes, and the legal system is strained by ‘gamesmanship’ or ‘hiding the ball,’ to no 
practical effect.”); id. at 2 (“The 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules specifically focused on discovery 
of ‘electronically stored information’ and emphasized early communication and cooperation in an effort to 
streamline information exchange, and avoid costly unproductive disputes.”). 
87 “In addition to rising monetary costs, courts have seen escalating motion practice, overreaching, 
obstruction, and extensive, but unproductive discovery disputes—in some cases precluding adjudication on 
the merits altogether—when parties treat the discovery process in an adversarial manner.” THE SEDONA 
CONFERENCE, supra note 86, at 1. The rules require that parties attempt to resolve any discovery dispute 
before moving for a protective order, FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1), or moving to compel discovery, FED. R. CIV. 
P. 37(a)(1). See Romero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. 96, 109 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (“The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, case law, and the Sedona Principles all further emphasize that electronic discovery should 
be a party-driven process.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
88 See Ward, supra note 21, at 566. 
89 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2012). 
90 See, e.g., Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 (C.D. Cal. 2010); In re 
Subpoena Duces Tecum to AOL, LLC, 550 F. Supp. 2d 606, 614 (E.D. Va. 2008); O’Grady v. Superior 
Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 89 (Ct. App. 2006). 
91 Facebook has a policy of not providing information in response to civil subpoenas. In response to the 
question whether someone can obtain Facebook contents, Facebook states:  
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Thus, the issue ends up in front of the court anyway, even without the request going 
directly to a party. Accordingly, too many judicial resources are devoted to a process that 
should largely operate without court involvement.92 Only in the situation where a person 
has deleted arguably relevant information on his or her SNS account would the provider 
need to be involved.93 Otherwise, the information is within the possession, custody, or 
control of the party itself and should be requested from the party.94  
¶32  A recent order in the Eastern District of New York specifically recognized the 
impropriety of seeking access to SNS postings from the third-party provider rather than 
from the party herself. In Giacchetto v. Patchogue-Medford Union Free School District, 
the magistrate judge denied the defendant’s request for authorizations for the release of 
records from the SNS hosts. 95 The court found the decision in Howell “ordering 
plaintiff’s counsel to access plaintiff’s social media accounts and produce responsive 
information as opposed to having plaintiff provide defendant with her usernames and 
passwords,” to be “persuasive and reasonable” and therefore directed that plaintiff’s 
counsel make the appropriate relevant production. 96 
D. Movement Toward a Better Approach 
¶33  An increasing number of courts reject the all-or-nothing and threshold approaches 
and realize that discovery of social media, like other discovery, must focus on relevance 
of individual content, not wholesale access.97  
 
Federal law prohibits Facebook from disclosing user content (such as messages, Timeline 
posts, photos, etc.) in response to a civil subpoena. Specifically, the Stored Communications 
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., prohibits Facebook from disclosing the contents of an account 
to any non-governmental entity pursuant to a subpoena or court order.  
 
Parties to civil litigation may satisfy discovery requirements relating to their Facebook 
accounts by producing and authenticating contents of their accounts and by using 
Facebook’s “Download Your Information” tool, which is accessible through the Settings 
drop down menu.  
 
If a user cannot access content because he or she disables or deleted his or her account, 
Facebook will, to the extent possible, restore access to allow the user to collect and produce 
the account’s content. Facebook preserves user content only in response to a valid law 
enforcement request.  
May I Obtain Contents of a User’s Account from Facebook Using a Civil Subpoena?, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/133221086752707?sr=1&sid=0wo6y3b2rP0ejHsrD (last visited Mar. 26, 
2014). 
92 While the advisory committee, in discussing rules changes, stresses early judicial involvement in case 
management, in no way does the committee encourage more discovery motion practice. See infra Section 
III. C. 
93 Id.; see also Allied Concrete Co. v. Lester, 736 S.E.2d 699 (Va. 2013). 
94 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34. 
95 Giacchetto v. Patchogue-Medford Union Free Sch. Dist., 293 F.R.D. 112 (E.D.N.Y. May 6, 2013). 
96 Id. at 117 (citing Howell v. Buckeye Ranch, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-1014, 2012 WL 5265170, at *1 (S.D. 
Ohio Oct. 1, 2012)). 
97 See Trail v. Lesko, No. GD-10-017249, 2012 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 194, at *20–21 (C.P. 
Allegheny County July 3, 2012) (describing the Pennsylvania threshold approach, and noting that other 
jurisdictions “have wrestled to establish a middle ground between the wholesale denial of the request on the 
one hand and the granting of unlimited access to the user’s profile on the other. Thus, some jurisdictions, 
when faced with these questions, fashion more narrowly tailored discovery orders and are more likely to 
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¶34  In an influential decision, a federal district court in Indiana rejected the threshold 
showing/wholesale access approach in favor of traditional application of the rules.98 In 
EEOC v. Simply Storage, an employment discrimination case, the employer sought broad 
access to the claimants’ Facebook and MySpace accounts. The court found that privacy 
concerns themselves were not sufficient to prevent access, but neither should the 
defendant be entitled to rummage through the claimants’ SNS accounts without 
limitation:  
Discovery of SNS requires the application of basic discovery principles in a 
novel context. . . . [T]he main challenge in this case is not one unique to 
electronically stored information generally or to social networking sites in 
particular. Rather, the challenge is to define appropriately broad limits—but 
limits nevertheless—on the discoverability of social communications in light of a 
subject as amorphous as emotional and mental health, and to do so in a way that 
provides meaningful direction to the parties.99  
¶35  In doing so, the court rejected the approach of other decisions allowing broad 
access because of the nature of the damages sought: “[T]he simple fact that a claimant 
has had social communications is not necessarily probative of the particular mental and 
emotional health matters at issue in the case. Rather, it must be the substance of the 
communication that determines relevance.”100 Similarly, the court reasoned that 
allegations of depression, stress disorders, and like injuries do not automatically render 
all SNS communications relevant.101 
¶36  The Simply Storage court also emphasized that the role of counsel in discovery of 
social media is no different from other contexts: “[l]awyers are frequently called upon to 
make judgment calls—in good faith and consistent with their obligations as officers of 
the court—about what information is responsive to another party’s discovery requests. 
Discovery is intended to be a self-regulating process that depends on the reasonableness 
and cooperation of counsel.”102 Therefore, the court ordered the plaintiffs’ counsel to 
gather relevant evidence from the SNS accounts and provide it to opposing counsel. The 
court explained, “[a]s with discovery generally, Simply Storage can further inquire of 
counsel and the claimants (in their depositions) about what has and has not been 
produced and can challenge the production if it believes the production falls short of the 
requirements of this order.”103 
 
rely on counsel to peruse the client’s profile for relevant information in the first instance.”). 
98 EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430 (S.D. Ind. 2010). 
99 Id. at 434. 
100 Id. at 435; see also Rozell v. Ross-Holst, No. 05 Civ. 2936(JGK)JCF, 2006 WL 163143, at *33 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2006) (“[While] anything that a person says or does might in some theoretical sense be 
reflective of her emotional state, . . . that is hardly justification for requiring production of every thought 
she may have reduced to writing or, indeed, the depositions of everyone she may have talked to.”). 
101 The court also found that the plaintiffs’ position that they should produce only communications that 
directly reference the matters alleged in the complaint is too restrictive. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 
F.R.D. at 435.  
102 Id. at 436. 
103 Id. at 436. See also Mackelprang v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Agency of Nev., Inc., No. 2:06-cv-00788-
JCM-GWF, 2007 WL 119149, at *8 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2007) (noting that it is the obligation of counsel, in 
responding to requests for production, to produce what is relevant: “Defendants are entitled to discover 
information relevant to Plaintiff’s alleged emotional distress and her mental condition, which she has 
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¶37  Other courts have followed this more sensible, traditional approach.104 In Brogan v. 
Rosenn, Jenkins, and Greenwald, LLP, the court rejected a request for login information:  
The Brogans do not request copies of Facebook messages concerning specific 
subjects during particular time periods. Rather, the Brogans seek to compel 
Breault to provide them with her Facebook username and password so that the 
Brogans may have unbridled access to any and all information contained on 
Breault’s Facebook account.  
. . . .  
A discovery request seeking carte blanche access to private social networking 
information is overly intrusive, would cause unreasonable embarrassment and 
burden in contravention of Pa.R.C.P. 4011(b), and is not properly tailored “with 
reasonable particularity” as required by the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil 
Procedure . . . . If the Brogans obtain Breault’s Facebook username and 
password, they would have an unrestricted license to peruse her entire Facebook 
account, and view highly sensitive information and potentially confidential 
communications that have no relevance to this lawsuit, including comments that 
were authored by third parties such as her Facebook “friends.”105 
¶38  Of course, just as with other discovery, if disputes arise as to whether the 
production is appropriate, then the parties will need to get the court involved.106 
¶39  In a recent decision from the Eastern District of New York, discussed above in the 
context of direct requests to SNSs, the court specifically recognized that the approach of 
other courts has been both overinclusive and underinclusive. In Giacchetto,107 the 
 
placed at issue in this case. . . . [i]f [information relevant to assessing the credibility of her emotional 
distress claims] exists in the email messages, Defendant is entitled to obtain its production.” But the proper 
method for doing so is “to serve upon Plaintiff properly limited requests for production of relevant email 
communications.”) (emphasis in original). 
104 See, e.g., Reid v. Ingerman Smith LLP, No. CV 2012-0307(ILG)(MDG), 2012 WL 6720752 
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2012); Howell v. Buckeye Ranch, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-1014, 2012 WL 5265170 (S.D. 
Ohio Oct. 1, 2012); Robinson v. Jones Lang LaSalle Ams., Inc., No. 3:12-cv-00127-PK, 2012 WL 
3763545, at *2 (D. Or. Aug. 29, 2012) (relying on Simply Storage, ordering plaintiff to produce 
communications on SNS that “reveal, refer, or relate to: any significant emotion, feeling, or mental state 
allegedly caused by defendant’s conduct; or events or communications that could reasonably be expected to 
produce a significant emotion, feeling, or mental state allegedly caused by defendant’s conduct” and noting 
that the court “expects counsel to determine what information falls within the scope of this Court’s order in 
good faith and consistent with their obligations as officers of the court.”); Mailhoit v. Home Depot U.S.A., 
Inc., 285 F.R.D. 566 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Sourdiff v. Tex. Roadhouse Holdings, LLC, No. 3:10-CV-0408 
(TJM/DEP), 2011 WL 7560647 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2011); Held v. Ferrellgas, Inc., No. 10-2393-EFM, 
2011 WL 3896513 (D. Kan. Aug. 31, 2011); Holter v. Wells Fargo and Co., 281 F.R.D. 340 (D. Minn. 
2011); Patterson v. Turner Const. Co., 931 N.Y.S.2d 311, 312 (App. Div. 2011). 
105 Brogan v. Rosenn, Jenkins & Greenwald, LLP, No. 08 CV 6048, 2013 WL 1742689, at *6–8 (Pa. 
C.P. Apr. 22, 2013) (internal citations omitted); see also Mackelprang, 2007 WL 119149 at *7 (“Ordering 
Plaintiff to execute the consent and authorization form for release of all of the private email messages on 
Plaintiff’s Myspace.com internet accounts would allow Defendants to cast too wide a net for any 
information that might be relevant and discoverable.”). 
106 See Gatto v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 10-cv-1090-ES-SCM, 2013 WL 1285285 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 
2013); Allied Concrete Co. v. Lester, 736 S.E.2d 699 (Va. 2013). 
107 Giacchetto v. Patchogue-Medford Union Free Sch. Dist., 293 F.R.D. 112 (E.D.N.Y. May 6, 2013). 
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plaintiff sued for wrongful termination. The defendant sought broad access to the 
plaintiff’s social media accounts. The court noted the “threshold evidentiary showing” 
that had been required in cases like Romano, and stated that:  
This approach can lead to results that are both too broad and too narrow. On the 
one hand, a plaintiff should not be required to turn over the private section of his 
or her Facebook profile (which may or may not contain relevant information) 
merely because the public section undermines the plaintiff’s claims. On the other 
hand, a plaintiff should be required to review the private section and produce any 
relevant information, regardless of what is reflected in the public section. The 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a party to prove the existence of 
relevant material before requesting it. Furthermore, this approach improperly 
shields from discovery the information of Facebook users who do not share any 
information publicly.108 
Therefore, the court followed the traditional approach and ordered disclosure of “specific 
references to the emotional distress she claims she suffered or treatment she received” in 
connection with her claim, as well as references to alternative causes of her distress.109 
III. FINDING PRIVACY IN A SEA OF E-DISCOVERY 
A. Putting Social Media in Context 
1. The Format 
¶40  One argument for seeking wholesale access to SNS accounts, either from the party 
or from the sites themselves, is that ordinary discovery of this material is not adequate to 
show its functionality or changes to its content. For example, producing hard copies of a 
page showing a person’s “status update” will not reveal the names of all the friends who 
“liked” that update, nor will it reveal deleted content. But parties are capable of obtaining 
this information (if it is relevant) with a variety of interrogatories, document requests, and 
deposition questions. Facebook itself directs its users on how to download all of their 
content.110 If there is a specific need for relevant SNS metadata in a particular case, that 
need would give a party a basis for seeking additional material.  
2. The Public Nature  
¶41  Underlying many courts’ reasoning in allowing wholesale access to social media 
discovery is a fundamental misunderstanding of social media sites. Rather than treating 
those sites as simply another location for relevant discoverable information, these courts 
treat them like a single treasure chest to which litigants are given the keys or not.111 They 
 
108 Id. at 114 n.1. 
109 Id. at 116. 
110 See In re White Tail Oilfield Services, L.L.C., No. 11-0009, 2012 WL 4857777, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 
11, 2012); see also May I Obtain Contents of a User’s Account from Facebook Using a Civil Subpoena?, 
supra note 91. 
111 See supra note 61 (listing cases).  
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consider the format in which SNS information is communicated as being tantamount to a 
waiver of any of the ordinary protection against irrelevant discovery. As one court put it,  
Facebook, MySpace and their ilk are social network computer sites people utilize 
to connect with friends and meet new people. That is, in fact, their purpose, and 
they do not bill themselves as anything else. Thus, while it is conceivable that a 
person could use them as forums to divulge and seek advice on personal and 
private matters, it would be unrealistic to expect that such disclosures would be 
considered confidential.112  
Therefore, the court held that the defendant was entitled to access to that content, 
regardless of its relevance. 
¶42  Similarly, the Zimmerman113 court noted:  
[b]y definition, a social networking site is the interactive sharing of your personal 
life with others; the recipients are not limited in what they do with such 
knowledge. With the initiation of litigation to seek a monetary award based upon 
limitations or harm to one’s person, any relevant, non-privileged information 
about one’s life that is shared with others and can be gleaned by defendants from 
the interest is fair game in today’s society.114 
¶43  While these observations might be relevant to whether litigants have a blanket 
privacy argument for protection of SNS information, they are not pertinent in a 
discoverability context. Our rules have never allowed blanket access to a person’s email 
account simply because those emails might have multiple recipients or otherwise are not 
“confidential.”115  
¶44  The analogies used by these courts further complicate the analysis of social media 
as a source of discovery. Fawcett likens production of Facebook information to 
production of a diary116—in other words, privacy is not a barrier to production since 
courts order disclosure of private materials like diaries.117 The court in EEOC v. 
Honeybaked Ham Co. analogized social media content to a file folder titled “Everything 
About Me” which the plaintiffs have shared with others:  
 
112 McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113-2010 CD, 2010 WL 4403285 (Pa. C.P. Sept. 9, 
2010). 
113 Zimmerman v. Weis Mkts., Inc., No. CV-09-1535, 2011 WL 2065410 (Pa. C.P. May 19, 2011). 
114 Id. at *3 (emphasis added); see also Mazzarella v. Mount Airy #1, LLC, No. 1798 Civil 2009 (Pa. 
C.P. Nov. 7, 2012) (“Those who elect to use social media, and place things on the internet for viewing, 
sharing and use with others, waives [sic] an expectation of privacy.”). 
115 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (limiting the scope of discovery to “nonprivileged matter that is relevant 
to any party's claim or defense” or, upon a showing of good cause to “any matter relevant to the subject 
matter involved in the action”); see also Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 (1984)  (“The 
Rules do not distinguish between public and private information.”). 
116 Fawcett v. Altieri, 960 N.Y.S.2d 592, 597 (Sup. Ct. 2013); see also Patterson v. Turner Const. Co., 
931 N.Y.S.2d 311, 312 (App. Div. 2011) (noting that personal diaries are not shielded from discovery just 
because they are private, but reversing a blanket order of production in favor of a more specific 
identification of relevant Facebook information). 
117 This leaves aside the fact that the diary as a whole must have been found likely to lead to the 
discovery of relevant evidence; otherwise, only parts of it should be produced. 
Vol. 12:3]  Allyson Haynes Stuart 
 168
If there are documents in this folder that contain information that is relevant or 
may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence relating to this lawsuit, the 
presumption is that it should be produced. The fact that it exists in cyberspace on 
an electronic device is a logistical and, perhaps, financial problem, but not a 
circumstance that removes the information from accessibility by a party opponent 
in litigation.118 
¶45  The problem is that these analogies may explain why social media is free game for 
discovery, but they make no distinction among the many disparate contents of a social 
media account, some of which may be relevant and many of which may not. 
¶46  In fact, SNS content is better analogized to a file cabinet containing many different 
materials, including a diary and personal files, any of which is discoverable only if it is 
relevant.119 A better approach can be found in Howell,120 where the court denied a broad 
SNS request, reasoning that “[t]he fact that the information defendants seek is in an 
electronic file as opposed to a file cabinet does not give them the right to rummage 
through the entire file.”121  
B. What Is the Implication of Using Privacy Settings? 
¶47  A primary source of the confusion underlying social media discovery is the 
conflation of concepts of privacy with traditional discovery. The public or private nature 
of SNS content is irrelevant to whether such content is subject to discovery. But the fact 
that content is subject to discovery does not mean there are no privacy protections. 
¶48  When an SNS user chooses to limit the audience with whom she shares her content, 
that choice should matter.122 The problem is whether, and to what extent, this affirmative 
limitation matters in the discovery context as opposed to others. Under current law, 
privacy settings should influence the level of Fourth Amendment protection given SNS 
content in the face of government and law enforcement searches, as well as the user’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the tort context.123 If a person has restricted her 
privacy settings, she is more likely to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in those 
communications. But in the civil discovery context the rules make little distinction 
between private and public information.124 The most salient distinction is an obvious one: 
 
118 EEOC v. Original Honeybaked Ham Co. of Ga., Inc., No. 11-cv-02560-MSK-MEH, 2012 WL 
5430974, at *1 (D. Colo. Nov. 7, 2012). 
119 The New York Appellate Court has recognized this. In Patterson, 931 N.Y.S.2d at 312, the court 
noted that personal diaries are not shielded from discovery just because they are private, and reversed a 
blanket order of production and remanded “for a more specific identification of plaintiff’s Facebook 
information that is relevant, in that it contradicts or conflicts with plaintiff’s alleged restrictions, 
disabilities, and losses, and other claims.”  
120 Howell v. Buckye Ranch, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-1014, 2012 WL 5265170 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 1, 2012). 
121 Id. at*1. 
122 See Allyson W. Haynes, Virtual Blinds: Finding Online Privacy in Offline Precedents, 14 VAND. J. 
ENT. & TECH. L. 603, 647 (2012) (arguing that, in analyzing whether a person has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in an online disclosure, the court should consider that person’s use of privacy settings limiting 
disclosure in online social networks). 
123 Id. 
124 See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 30 (1984). 
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if privacy settings are set to “public,” litigants can obtain the information without the 
necessity of filing any discovery request at all.125 
¶49  Under the federal rules and the many state systems modeled thereon, information in 
the possession or control of others is fair game for discovery requests as long as it is not 
privileged and is relevant.126 In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, a suit brought by a 
religious group leader against publishers and authors for defamation, the defendants 
sought discovery of the group’s donors and members. 127 The trial court noted that the 
plaintiffs had a recognizable privacy interest in the financial affairs of their organization, 
and so issued a protective order prohibiting the media parties from publishing, 
disseminating or using the information except in that case. In considering the appeal by 
those parties based on their First Amendment rights, the Supreme Court stressed that 
protective orders under Rule 26(c) are an important check on the liberal scope of pretrial 
discovery:  
Because of the liberality of pretrial discovery permitted by Rule 26(b)(1), it is 
necessary for the trial court to have the authority to issue protective orders 
conferred by Rule 26(c). It is clear from experience that pretrial discovery by 
depositions and interrogatories has a significant potential for abuse. This abuse is 
not limited to matters of delay and expense; discovery also may seriously 
implicate privacy interests of litigants and third parties. The Rules do not 
distinguish between public and private information. Nor do they apply only to 
parties to the litigation, as relevant information in the hands of third parties may 
be subject to discovery. 
There is an opportunity, therefore, for litigants to obtain—incidentally or 
purposefully—information that not only is irrelevant but if publicly released 
could be damaging to reputation and privacy. The government clearly has a 
substantial interest in preventing this sort of abuse of its processes.128  
¶50  The Court recognized that there was concern about undue and uncontrolled 
discovery, “[b]ut until and unless there are major changes in the present Rules of Civil 
Procedure, reliance must be had on what in fact and in law are ample powers of the 
district judge to prevent abuse.”129 Rule 26(c) represents one of those powers: “[a]lthough 
the Rule contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests that may 
be implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and language of the 
Rule.”130  
¶51  Even if information is forbidden from disclosure by the Privacy Act, it is 
potentially discoverable. As the district court noted in Hassan v. United States,131 
 
125 See Information We Receive and How It is Used, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info (last visited Mar. 26, 2014) (“Choosing to make 
something public is exactly what it sounds like: anyone, including people off Facebook, will be able to see 
it.”). 
126 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
127 See Seattle Times, 467 U.S. 20. 
128 Id. at 34–35 (emphasis supplied) (internal citations omitted). 
129 Id. at 34 n.20 (quoting Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176–77 (1979)). 
130 Id. at 20 n.21. 
131 Hassan v. United States, No. C05-1066C, 2006 WL 681038 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 15, 2006). 
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“general concerns of privacy are insufficient to justify the refusal to answer Plaintiffs’ 
discovery requests. The scope of discovery in federal court is very broad. . . . Even where 
information is subject to the protections of the Privacy Act of 1974, ‘a party can invoke 
discovery of materials protected by the Privacy Act through the normal discovery process 
and according to the usual discovery standards, and the test of discoverability is the 
relevance standard of Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.’”132 
¶52  Thus information arguably deemed private is not immune from discovery under our 
rules, but instead is capable of protection based on protective orders under Rule 
26(b)(2)(C)(iii) or Rule 26(c),133 confidentiality orders, and the use of in camera 
inspections.134 The types of personal information that have been recognized as deserving 
protection under these measures include medical135 and psychiatric136 records, police 
personnel files,137 prison files,138 information presenting a threat to physical security,139 
and information that otherwise invades a person’s privacy without a showing of need.140  
 
132 Id. at *2 (quoting Laxalt v. McClatchy, 809 F.2d 885, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). In Laxalt, the court of 
appeals did note that a court might have a heightened responsibility to utilize devices such as protective 
orders and in camera inspection where information might be protected by the Privacy Act. Id. at 2 n.5. 
133 See Bennett v. Kingsbridge Heights Rehabilitation Care Ctr., No. 07 Civ. 9456(LAK), 2009 WL 
3294301, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2009) (“When discovery is sought by a party in a civil case, the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure authorize a judge to preclude certain discovery if ‘the burden . . . of the proposed 
discovery outweighs its likely benefit’ . . . . The word ‘burden’ also includes ‘risks to . . . physical security 
and privacy.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
134 See Laxalt, 809 F.2d at 889 (finding that material protected by the Privacy Act was not immune from 
pretrial disclosure, but a court might have a heightened responsibility in that situation to utilize devices 
such as protective orders and in camera inspection). 
135 Barker v. Barker, 909 So.2d 333, 338 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (“By failing to provide for an in 
camera inspection of Hugh’s medical records to prevent disclosure of information that is not relevant to the 
litigation, the discovery order departed from the essential requirements of the law.”). 
136 Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 618–19 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (considering privacy concerns 
raised by production of psychiatric evaluations, psychological and physical health records of police 
officers). 
137 Id. at 616–17; Rogers v. G.J. Giurbino, 288 F.R.D. 469, 484–85 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (finding privacy 
claims in response to discovery request in prisoner 1983 claim outweighed by need for the discovery); King 
v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180, 190 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding that a showing of need must be made before 
placing the burden of in camera inspection on the magistrate, and recommending the use of protective 
orders restricting disclosure to the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s attorney, or to the plaintiff’s attorney alone, 
and suggesting redaction by the magistrate of “sensitive bits of information not useful to the plaintiffs,” 
such as officers’ home addresses, in a dispute over discovery of personnel files in a civil rights action).  
138 Labrew v. City of N.Y., No. 07 Civ. 4641 (DAB)(DFE), 2009 WL 3747165 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2009) 
(denying under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) production of prison log sheet based on 
privacy rights of prisoners whose names would be disclosed). 
139 Bennett v. Kingsbridge Heights Rehabilitation Care Ctr., No. 07 Civ. 9456(LAK), 2009 WL 3294301 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2009) (protecting from disclosure names of employees who complained about threats 
constituting unfair labor practices).            
140 Stampf v. Long Island R.R. Co., No. 07-CV-3349 (SMG), 2009 WL 3628109, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 
27, 2009) (granting protective order against production of witness’s claims, grievance, arbitration and 
litigation files with his employer: “the nature of the material is such that its production would invade the 
privacy of Mr. Jackson, who is not a party to the action and finds himself enmeshed in it only because he 
happened to be present when certain events in dispute took place. In contrast, the importance of the 
discovery at issue to resolving the issues in the case is, at best, minimal.”).  
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C. Narrowing the Scope of Discovery  
¶53  Discovery has grown by leaps and bounds given the fact that so much more of our 
communications are recorded and stored. Conversations that would have taken place on 
the telephone, remembered only by the parties to it, are now recorded as chat sessions, 
text messages, or email messages.141 The changes in discovery that have been wrought by 
the Internet, cloud computing, social media and other electronic discovery necessitate 
that we re-think our rules. Privacy should be a basis for limiting discovery, although it 
should be balanced against a litigant’s right to seek relevant documents. And it should not 
be based solely on privacy settings, which could lead to misuse of those settings. Instead, 
we need to balance intrusiveness against the permissible search for the truth.  
¶54  One potential solution to overbroad discovery in general that has been proposed by 
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules is to contain the scope of discovery in two 
ways.142 First, the revised rule would restrict the defined scope of discovery to 
information that is “proportional to the needs of the case considering the amount in 
controversy, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the parties’ resources, the 
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of 
the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”143 Second, the proposal would delete 
the following two sentences currently in Rule 26(b)(1): “For good cause, the court may 
order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. 
Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”144 Those sentences 
would be replaced by the following: “Information within this scope of discovery need not 
be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.”145 
¶55  The changes arise out of the conference held at Duke University School of Law  in 
May 2010.146 The subcommittee from the Duke Conference noted that:  
 
141 Ralph Losey refers to this phenomenon as “TMI.” See Ralph Losey, Rethinking Relevance: A Call to 
Modify the Rules of Discovery, E-DISCOVERY TEAM (Jan. 24, 2011, 8:08 PM),  
http://e-discoveryteam.com/2011/01/24/rethinking-relevancy-a-call-to-change-the-rules-to-narrow-the-
scope-of-ESI-relevance. 
142 Memorandum from Hon. David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure to Hon. Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 9–11 
(May 8, 2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV05-
2013.pdf. [hereinafter Advisory Committee Report]; see Henry Kelston, Are We on the Cusp of Major 
Changes to E-Discovery Rules?, LAW TECH. NEWS (Apr. 17, 2013), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202596362366&Are_We_on_the_Cu
sp_of_Major_Changes_to_EDiscovery_Rules&slreturn=20130420162952. 
143 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 142, at 10, 30. 
144 Id. at 10–11, 30. The rules were changed in 2000 to require a court order for the broader “subject 
matter” scope of discovery, but have been largely ineffective at limiting the scope of discovery. See id. at 
11 (“Despite the 2000 amendment, many cases continue to cite the ‘reasonably calculated’ language as 
though it defines the scope of discovery, and judges often hear lawyers argue that this sentence sets a broad 
standard for appropriate discovery.”); see also Losey, supra note 141 (“It was a big mistake to think this 
minor change would do anything to stem the tide of discovery cost inflation. In fact, this minor revision had 
no impact whatsoever, and most practitioners today are unaware of the slight change to a two-step good-
cause process.”). 
145 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 142, at 11, 30. 
146 Id. at 1. 
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serious, even grave problems persist in enough cases to generate compelling calls 
for further attempts to control excessive discovery. The geometric growth in 
potentially discoverable information generated by electronic storage adds still 
more imperative concerns.147  
These changes have the potential for being very helpful in containing the scope of 
electronic discovery into areas that are only marginally relevant. In its Report to the 
Standing Committee, the Advisory Committee noted that its proposals “seek to promote 
responsible use of discovery proportional to the needs of the case,” by transferring the 
proportionality provision currently in Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) to 26(b)(1)’s limit on scope of 
discovery.148 It also deletes from that scope discovery into the “subject matter involved in 
the action.”149 The Committee asserted that limiting the “reasonably calculated” phrase 
will further the purpose of the 2000 amendment, especially in light of subsequent 
misinterpretation that has “obliterate[d] all limits on the scope of discovery.”150 
¶56  These limitations could go a long way towards reducing fishing expeditions on the 
part of counsel seeking damaging admissions and character evidence from SNSs, not to 
mention alternative causes of action.151 Privacy considerations, including privacy settings, 
could be weighed as part of the “burden” of proposed discovery under Rule 26 (b)(1) that 
could outweigh the negligible benefit of that information. 
¶57  In particular, courts could distinguish between relevance to the claims and defenses 
themselves and relevance to potential impeachment in weighing intrusive discovery 
against the importance of that discovery to the issues at stake. We already make this 
distinction in the rules on voluntary disclosures.152 Most of the “fishing expeditions” 
sought by litigants in the social media realm are in the hopes of finding contradictory 
 
147 Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, in COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE AGENDA BOOK 226 (2013), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Standing/ST2013-01.pdf.  
148 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 142, at 9–10. 
149 Id. at 10–11. 
150 Id. at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules, supra note 147, at 227 (“Too many lawyers, and perhaps judges, understand the rule to mean that 
there are no limits on discovery, because it is always possible that somehow, somewhere, a bit of relevant 
information may be uncovered.”). 
151 Ralph Losey argues:  
 
The scope of discovery should be constricted in two ways. First, relevance should be 
limited to the claims and defenses raised. It should not be extended to the general subject 
matter of the case. It should not allow fishing expeditions into other possible causes of 
action. The good cause exception should be eliminated. That is a signal that the Bench 
and Bar will hear. 
 
Secondly, if ESI is not relevant or trustworthy enough to be admissible evidence, it 
should not be discoverable. Period. ESI directly relevant to claims and defenses is already 
voluminous. The additional grey areas of ESI that appears to someone as reasonably 
calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence, is inherently excessive and 
burdensome. It is a luxury we can no longer afford. 
Losey, supra note 141. 
152 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i) (requiring initial disclosure of individuals likely to have 
discoverable information “that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use 
would be solely for impeachment”). 
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impeachment evidence. Such evidence could be considered “disproportional to the needs 
of the case” if the privacy concerns are not outweighed by the relevance to the issues and 
limited scope of the information. 
¶58  One interesting example of a court restricting potential discovery based on privacy 
interests is Coates v. Mystic Blue Cruises Inc.153 There, the District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois considered the argument of a plaintiff in a sexual harassment 
suit that social media discovery requested by the defendant violated the restriction on use 
of other sexual relations embodied in Federal Rule of Evidence 412. The court ordered a 
limited production of messages and allowed redaction of personal information.154 The 
well-reasoned restrictions on admissible evidence represented in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence could be translated into restrictions on pretrial discovery as well.155  
D. Privacy Protection Under the Rules 
¶59  Apart from a reduction in scope of discovery or other change in the rules, the place 
for privacy protection under the traditional approach is as follows. First, privacy is not an 
argument for immunity from discovery. As the Supreme Court has made clear, discovery 
encompasses all relevant material, whether public or private, confidential or privileged 
(although privileged material may be withheld if listed in a privilege log156). Second, 
discovery requests should not be overbroad—and any blanket request for access to SNS 
accounts is likely overbroad.157 Third, the producing party has the burden of seeking 
protection against production of information that is covered by a proper discovery request 
but would invade the privacy of the party or of a non-party.158 That protection can take 
several forms. The more difficult to obtain would be a motion for a protective order 
asking that the party be allowed to withhold the material from production altogether.159 
The burden for the party seeking this motion is high: the party must show that her privacy 
 
153 Coates v. Mystic Blue Cruises, No. 11 C 1986, 2012 WL 3860036 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2012). 
154 Id.; see also Mackelprang v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Agency of Nev., Inc., No. 2:06-cv-00788-JCM-
GWF, 2007 WL 119149 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2007). 
155 See Losey, supra note 141 (advocating that discovery be limited not only to relevant evidence but to 
admissible evidence only). 
156 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(A). 
157 See Howell v. Buckeye Ranch, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-1014, 2012 WL 5265170 (denying requests for user 
names and passwords for all SNS as overbroad; defendants should request relevant information from the 
plaintiff, who can then provide it). 
158 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1). As stated in Wright & Miller,  
The rule requires that good cause be shown for a protective order. This puts the 
burden on the party seeking relief to show some plainly adequate reason therefore. The 
courts have insisted on a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished 
from stereotyped and conclusory statements, in order to establish good cause. This 
recognizes that the existence of good cause for a protective order is a factual matter to be 
determined from the nature and character of the information sought by deposition or 
interrogatory weighed in the balance of the factual issues involved in each action. 
8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2035 (3d ed. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
159 To obtain a protective order, the party seeking protection must make a particularized and specific 
demonstration of fact under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 (c)(1). Autotech Techs. L.P. v. 
Automationdirect.com, Inc., 235 F.R.D. 435, 440 (N.D. Ill. 2006); see Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 
89, 102 n.16 (1981).  
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interest is not outweighed by the relevance of the discovery to a specific issue in the case 
and that the privacy cannot be adequately protected by other means.160 Lesser remedies 
include motions for a protective order restricting the divulgence of materials outside the 
confines of the litigation.161 Also appropriate are requests that the court conduct in camera 
review of the material to assist in identifying private material, which can then be withheld 
from production or redacted.162 The in camera review should not be used every time 
social media evidence is disclosed; instead, it should only be utilized in circumstances 
where specific private information is subject to disclosure.163 The court has broad 
discretion in ordering these protective measures.164 
¶60  The type of information properly subject to restriction from discovery based on 
privacy interests deserves further attention but at the least should include certain medical 
information,165 information about sexual relations,166 personal information about a 
minor,167 personal information about a victim of sexual assault,168 and other potential 
embarrassing personal information.169 The more relevant the discovery to a specific issue 
in the case, the less likely the discovery will be protected. 
 
160 See A. Farber & Partners, Inc. v. Garber, 234 F.R.D. 186, 191 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (“Here, plaintiff’s 
need for defendant Garber’s financial documents outweighs defendant Garber’s claim of privacy, especially 
when the ‘impact’ of the disclosure of the information can be protected by a ‘carefully drafted’ protective 
order.”) (citations omitted); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“Resolution of 
a privacy objection or request for a protective order requires a balancing of the need for the information 
sought against the privacy right asserted. A carefully drafted protective order could minimize the impact of 
this disclosure.”) (internal citations omitted). 
161 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(F) & (G); see Layne Christensen Co. v. Purolite Co., 271 F.R.D. 240, 242–
43, 247–48 (D. Kan. 2010) (granting a two-tier protective order limiting the disclosure of confidential 
information produced during discovery and allowing the parties to designate some materials as limited to 
“Attorneys’ Eyes Only”). 
162 See Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 619 (“Due to the highly sensitive nature of [Defendant police officers’ 
medical records], this Court will conduct an in camera review of the medical records requested in Requests 
6, 7 and 8.”). 
163 Id. 
164 Aluminum Co. of Am. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., 444 F. Supp. 1342, 1347 (D.D.C. 
1978) (“It is well established that a court has broad discretion under Rule 26(c)(7) in determining both 
whether a protective order is warranted and the specific restrictions to be imposed.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
165 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977) (recognizing a limited privacy interest in the 
confidentiality of medical records). 
166 See Coates v. Mystic Blue Cruises, Inc., No. 11 C 1986, 2012 WL 3860036 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2012). 
167 See Breed v. U. S. Dist. Ct. for N. Dist. of Cal., 542 F.2d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 1976) (minors’ privacy 
interests in ward files). 
168 See United States v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, No. CIV 08-0501 JB/ACT, 2010 WL 1141362, at *3 
(D.N.M. Mar. 8, 2010) (granting motion for a protective order to the extent that it seeks to limit how and 
with whom the defendant can use any evidence of the victims’ alleged sexual behavior or sexual 
predisposition). 
169 See Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne Coll., 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1977) (upholding trial court’s refusal to 
require college to produce confidential evaluations of each faculty member because confidentiality is 
necessary to encourage honest and candid appraisals); Melendez v. Primavera Meats, Inc., 270 F.R.D. 143 
(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that courts are reluctant to compel disclosure of income tax returns because of the 
private nature of sensitive information contained in them and the public interest in encouraging complete 
and accurate returns); Flagg v. City of Detroit, 268 F.R.D. 279 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (finding good cause for a 
protective order where disclosure of materials placed under seal, including police department’s murder 
investigation file, depositions of law enforcement officers, and material produced by nonparty police 
officers, had the potential to interfere with the ongoing murder investigation and to threaten nonparties’ 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
¶61  Social media is apparently here to stay, and it will continue to play a large part in 
pretrial discovery in a broad range of cases. Courts need to put this discovery in context 
and treat it like other potentially relevant information. Particularly in cases alleging 
emotional damages and severe physical damages, courts have been too willing to allow 
blanket access to a person’s SNS information given the barest showing that the account 
may contain relevant information (including information relevant only to impeachment). 
And parties have too often sought that blanket access both from each other and from the 
SNSs themselves. Instead, SNS information should be part of regular discovery requests, 
and given no less—and no more—protection than other private communications. 
¶62  A broader issue is containment of discovery in general. The participants at the 
Duke Conference in 2010 noted the myriad of issues in our civil litigation system, 
particularly with respect to discovery.170 The Advisory Committee notes: 
discovery runs out of proportion in a worrisome number of cases, particularly 
those that are complex, involve high stakes, and generate particularly contentious 
adversary behavior. The number of cases and the burdens imposed present 
serious problems. These problems have not yet been solved.171 
The costs outweigh the benefits and threaten the pursuit of justice in a substantial number 
of cases. Limitations on discovery are necessary to ensure a more level playing field, the 
protection of litigants’ privacy, and an increased focus on the actual issues, as opposed to 













privacy interest); Duling v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., 266 F.R.D. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding possible 
harm from disclosure of personal information in employers’ personnel files demonstrated a particular need 
for protection); Flaherty v. Seroussi, 209 F.R.D. 300 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (granting protective order against 
disclosure of medical, educational, and other inherently private information concerning individual 
employees of the city, particularly those who were not parties to the action); Star Scientific, Inc. v. Carter, 
204 F.R.D. 410 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (finding that tobacco company established good cause for entry of a 
protective order to secure trade secrets).   
170 See SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE (2012) (describing its project to study issues relating to ESI prompted by the May 2010 
Conference on Civil Litigation held at Duke University School of Law and noting that it is considering 
potential rules amendments aimed at reducing the costs and delay in civil litigation); Report of the Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules, supra note 147, at 19. 
171 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 142, at 10. 












































          
